Defining Financial Stability and Establishing a Framework to Safeguard It by Garry J. Schinasi & Rodrigo Alfaro
29
This article was written while Schinasi was on sabbatical from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) at Bruegel in Brussels, Belgium.
 
This paper is based on previous work, including papers written with coauthors 
listed in the reference section. I am grateful to Rodrigo Cifuentes and Vitor Gaspar 
for comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed in this paper are those of the 
author and do not represent the views of the IMF.
Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking, edited by Rodrigo A. 
Alfaro, Santiago, Chile. © 2010 Central Bank of Chile.
deFining Financial Stability




The ongoing global financial crisis has been a rude awakening 
that the current framework for safeguarding financial stability 
is neither reliable nor effective. The threats to global economic 
stability caused by the dysfunction of credit and money markets and 
the weakening of the global banking system also make clear that 
safeguarding the stability of the financial system is as important a 
policy objective as maintaining monetary stability if economic growth 
and stability are to be achieved and sustained. 
Despite the global financial industry’s importance measured 
in terms of value added to global production and employment, 
global finance is not an end in and of itself. It is, instead, a means 
to enhancing and facilitating the efficiency of economic processes 
such as resource allocation, risk allocation and pricing, wealth 
accumulation, and ultimately economic growth and prosperity. 
The massive and destructive deleveraging still underway signals 
that the global financial industry has been missing this point for 
quite some time—as if finance existed for the benefit of highly 
paid financiers and outsized rates of return. However, much of the 
virulence of this crisis could not have occurred without the policy 
shortcomings and mistakes that inadvertently either encouraged 
or acquiesced to excessive risk taking and the accumulation of 
imbalances. Playing key roles in this regard were misaligned 
private incentives, ineffective regulations and business practices 30 Garry J. Schinasi
(or rules of the game), and inadequate official oversight of financial 
institutions and markets, not to mention excessively expansionary 
global monetary and macroeconomic policies. 
The financial system policy framework in place prior to the 
crisis—which has already been transformed significantly in the 
United States and Europe—failed dramatically. This framework 
was a patchwork of rules of the game and regulatory and supervisory 
principles and institutions that emerged in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression and which has since evolved in response to 
repeated, but individually unique, experiences of economic cycles 
of growth and recessions, financial cycles of boom and bust, and 
dramatic and at times system-transforming financial innovation. 
In effect, the policy apparatus for safeguarding financial stability 
did not keep pace with financial innovation, modernization, and 
globalization and failed to prevent financial imbalances from 
arising, accumulating, and compounding, to the point of a global 
systemic financial crisis and quite possibly the worst global 
economic crisis since the 1930s.
The resulting framework relied too heavily (and naively) on 
private risk management and market discipline to safeguard 
financial stability and not enough on appropriate incentives, 
effective rules of the game, and well designed and rigorously 
implemented official oversight. The balance of emphasis in policy 
will likely now swing in the direction of realigning private and 
public incentives, redesigning new rules of the game appropriate 
for a modern global financial system, and significantly enhancing 
the reliance on official oversight through improved supervision 
of institutions and surveillance of markets. These efforts should 
also include reforms to enhance financial reporting, disclosure, 
and market transparency in an effort to improve the effectiveness 
of market discipline in preventing the build up of catastrophic 
financial imbalances. 
A prerequisite for more effective official oversight is the 
development and implementation of a more effective framework for 
assessing the financial system’s ability to perform its key economic 
functions.1 However, the ultimate objective of promoting efficient 
finance and of safeguarding financial stability once it is achieved 
1. The key functions include matching the needs of savers and investors; providing 
transactions and payments services; risk pricing, spreading, sharing, and management; 
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is sustained economic growth, stability, and prosperity. From this 
perspective, no policy framework can effectively safeguard financial 
stability if it does not place these core objectives front and center, 
including in the very definition of financial stability.
With this as background, the purpose of this paper is twofold: 
first, to establish a definition of financial stability and create a 
framework for policy analysis that is more closely aligned with 
economic processes and efficiency; and, second, to examine the 
implications and challenges for assessing systemic risk and 
safeguarding financial system stability. The definition links the 
effectiveness of finance and the financial system to its ability 
to facilitate the efficiency of economic processes such as wealth 
accumulation, economic growth, and economic efficiency more 
generally, as well as risk pricing and management. This means that 
assessing the stability of the financial system would become a vital 
step in evaluating the stability of the economy in general and the 
appropriateness of microeconomic and macroeconomic policies. This 
perhaps makes assessing financial stability even more challenging 
than assessing the potential for instability, but this way of framing 
the intermediate objective of safeguarding financial stability at 
least offers the possibility of designing policies that proactively 
promote economic efficiency and health. This more positive and 
proactive disposition could reap benefits in terms of warding off 
the accumulation of the kind of financial imbalances that could 
threaten financial stability. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section of the paper 
briefly discusses the existing framework of prevention and resolution 
of financial instability. This framework relied heavily on lines of 
defense against financial instability, almost as if finance were 
some kind of disease. All of the existing lines of defense failed to 
prevent the subprime crisis from occurring and, importantly, from 
spreading to all other international financial centers. The paper 
then motivates a definition of financial stability and relates it to 
economic processes and economic efficiency. This section argues 
that the concepts of financial efficiency and economic stability 
cannot be separated as clearly as they are in theoretical micro- and 
macroeconomic analysis, in part because finance is not an end, but 
a means to promoting economic efficiency, growth, and stability. 
If finance is ineffective and prone to repeated systemic booms and 
busts, it is unlikely to promote intertemporal economic efficiency 
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case in the ongoing global crisis. Finally, the paper discusses some 
of the more important challenges in assessing financial stability in 
an effort to safeguard the financial system from potential financial 
imbalances. An implication of the analysis is that intertemporal 
efficient wealth accumulation and growth can only be safeguarded 
with a financial stability framework that incorporates and integrates 
important elements of economics and finance, at both the macro- and 
microeconomic levels. 
1. exisTing poliCy fRamewoRk
The existing policy framework for safeguarding financial stability 
has evolved through time based, in part, on the realizations that 
finance is subject to market imperfections and that it is a public 
good. This framework has been portrayed in officialdom as a series 
of lines of defense against financial imbalances that could arise, 
and have arisen often enough, from underlying structural market 
imperfections and unexpected shocks. The lines of defense have 
been designed to prevent imbalances from becoming systemic and 
to resolve systemic difficulties should one or more of the defenses be 
breached. This section briefly summarizes the existing framework 
within the context of cross-border finance, although the framework 
presented is also a reasonable characterization of existing national 
and regional frameworks in advanced countries and the major 
international financial centers.
1.1 Policy Issues and Concerns
At the global level, the channels through which financial 
instability can be transmitted from one country to another can usefully 
be classified into three broad categories: institutions, markets, and 
infrastructures. This triad—together with legal and monetary 
arrangements, business practices, and codes of conduct—provides a 
reasonable definition of what is normally meant by the term financial 
system, which is discussed more fully later. Cross-border linkages 
of components of this triad can be seen as constituting the main 
channels through which problems in one national financial system 
get transmitted to another. In addition to these financial channels, 
the global economy is probably the most basic and prevalent cross-
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the purview of macroeconomists and macroeconomic policymakers 
and not this paper. 
To provide context, table 1 summarizes some public policy issues 
and concerns around which the existing policy framework has 
evolved. Roughly speaking, the issues involve one or more market 
imperfections (or market failures). Three broad global policy issues 
(specified in the three rows of table 1) arise to varying degrees from 
three potential channels of systemic concern (the three columns of 
the table). The policy issues are protecting investors and markets, 
dealing with safety net issues and moral hazard, and assessing and 
mitigating cross-border and systemic risk. The three channels are 
cross-border banks, foreign exchange and other global markets, and 
unregulated entities, such as hedge funds, structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs), and other special purpose vehicles. 
All three issues are very important for banks generally and 
cross-border banks in particular. They are all also important for 
global markets. Investor protection and safety net issues are widely 
seen as not being relevant for unregulated entities, while the most 
recent crisis clearly indicates that unregulated entities can pose 
systemic risk.
Table 1. Public Policy Issues and Concerns
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1.2 Policy Framework
Taking this classification as given, table 2 presents how these 
risks and public policy concerns are addressed through financial 
policies. It tries to answer the question: To what extent are the tools 
of financial policies used to address these concerns? 
Table 2. Oversight Regimes
Lines of defense






























As indicated in the first column of table 2, large cross-border 
banking groups, including the large internationally active banks, are 
probably the most closely regulated and supervised organizations on 
the planet, and for good reasons. These institutions pose financial 
risks for depositors, investors, markets, and even unrelated financial 
stakeholders because of their size, scope, complexity, and risk 
taking. Some of them are intermediaries, investors, brokers, dealers, 
insurers, reinsurers, or infrastructure owners and participants—and 
a single complex institution can sometimes play several of these 
roles. Cross-border institutions are systemically important: all of 
them nationally, many of them regionally, and about twenty or so 
of them globally. Protection, safety net, and systemic risks are key 
pubic policy challenges. Finally, oversight occurs at the national 
level, through both market discipline and official involvement, and at 
the international level, through committees and groups. As a result, 
banks, generally, and cross-border and global banks are probably the 
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At  the  other  extreme  of  regulation  and  supervision  are 
unregulated entities, shown in the right-most column of table 2. 
They are neither regulated nor supervised. Many of the financial 
instruments that these unregulated entities strategically and 
tactically use, such as over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, are not 
subject to securities regulation, and the markets in which they 
transact are by and large the least regulated and supervised. This 
is part of the investment strategy, and it defines the scope of profit 
making. Unregulated entities (including hedge funds and certain 
kinds of SIVs) are forbidden in some national jurisdictions. In 
jurisdictions where they are partially regulated, this is tantamount to 
being forbidden, given the global nature and fungibility of the hedge-
fund business model. A key characteristic of unregulated entities is 
that while their market activities are subject to market surveillance 
just like other institutions, this does not make transparent who is 
doing what, how they are doing it, and with whom they are doing it. 
Investor protection is not an issue for most individual unregulated 
entities, as they restrict their investor base to institutions (such as 
pension funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds) and wealthy 
individuals willing to invest in relatively high minimum amounts. 
It is, however, increasingly an issue for hedge funds, with the 
advent of funds-of-hedge-funds that allow minimum investments 
of relatively small amounts less than $100,000 or even less than 
$50,000 in hedge funds. Finally, concerns that hedge funds may 
represent a potential systemic risk have increased since the Asian 
and Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crises, particularly 
considering their tremendous growth over the past several years; I 
return to this theme below.
Global markets fall in between being and not being regulated and 
supervised. Global markets include the foreign exchange markets and 
their associated derivatives markets (for both exchange-traded and 
over-the-counter derivatives) and the fixed-income markets and their 
associated derivatives markets. Dollar, euro, and yen government 
bonds are traded more or less in a continuous global market, and 
the associated derivatives activities are also global.
Global markets are only indirectly regulated. They are subject 
to surveillance through private international networks and 
business-cooperation agreements, through information sharing 
by central banks and supervisory and regulatory authorities, and 
through official channels, committees, and working groups. Parts 
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payments infrastructures, so they are also subject to surveillance 
through these channels. The risks they potentially pose are less of 
a concern to the extent that the major players in them—namely, 
the large internationally active banks—are supervised and market 
disciplined by financial stakeholders. If there is poor oversight 
of the major institutions, then these global markets are subject 
to considerable risks, including a greater likelihood of systemic 
risk. One obvious example would be the global over-the-counter 
derivatives markets, which are unregulated and have little 
oversight except through the regulation and supervision of the 
institutions that engage in the bulk of these markets’ activities. 
Both investor protection and systemic risk are challenging public 
policy issues for these markets.
Regarding infrastructure, large internationally active institutions 
typically are major participants in domestic and international 
clearance, settlement, and payments infrastructures—both public 
and private—as well as the major trading exchanges. Many of them 
co-own parts of the national and international infrastructures and 
have a natural interest in their performance and viability. Incentives 
are, to some extent, aligned to achieve both private and collective 
net benefits. Increasingly, however, internationally active banks 
have been more heavily involved in OTC transactions, which do not 
pass through these infrastructures. This poses challenges in terms 
of systemic risk, many of which have surfaced dramatically in the 
ongoing global financial crisis. 
1.3 Lines of Defense against Systemic Risks and Events
As the rows of table 2 make clear, this framework relies on 
four lines of defense for preventing problems from occurring and 
becoming systemic and for dealing with them when they do become 
systemic (nationally, regionally, and globally). These can be roughly 
categorized as private risk management; market discipline; official 
oversight; and crisis management and resolution mechanisms. 
—Private risk management includes financial-risk management 
at business-line levels; enterprise risk management at the firm level; 
management controls at executive and senior-management levels; 
corporate governance at the board level; and self-regulation via 
development and promotion of best business practices. 
—Market  discipline  encompasses  sound  accounting  and 
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transactions and statements; the timely reporting and disclosure to 
allow investors to assess risks; well-functioning markets for price 
discovery and resource and risk allocation; and legal infrastructure 
for the enforcement of financial contracts. 
—Key features of public sector oversight include transparent 
and enforceable legal infrastructure; effective market regulation 
and surveillance; and effective oversight of financial institutions, 
in which the banks are the most heavily regulated and supervised, 
investment banks are subject to SEC regulations, insurance and 
reinsurance are lightly regulated, other institutional investors are 
lightly regulated, and some activities are unregulated. 
—Finally, crisis management and resolution mechanisms 
involve  deposit  insurance  protection  to  prevent  bank  runs; 
appropriate liquidity provision by the central bank to keep markets 
functioning smoothly; lender-of-last-resort operations to prevent 
market dysfunctioning and to keep illiquid but viable financial 
institutions from failing; and capital injections (preferably private 
rather than public) to maintain orderly transitions for institutions 
that are not viable. 
The ongoing global crisis triggered by the U.S. subprime crisis 
occurred because most, if not all, of these lines of defense failed 
in significant ways. The implementation of this framework, whose 
aim is to prevent instability, was not successful in preventing the 
kind of imbalances that created systemic risk and systemic events. 
Moreover, the central banks and fiscal authorities, and in many 
cases the legislators, in the advanced countries had to become 
innovative in creating new tools and finding the financing to support 
them to prevent further damage to both financial systems and 
economies. Even more innovative reforms and policy tools may be 
required to regain economic and financial stability. 
1.4 In the Breach: Characteristics of the Current 
Global Financial Crisis
Although the crisis was triggered by the U.S. subprime mortgage 
crisis and by housing market booms and bubbles in Europe, many 
other factors also contributed to the crisis, including excessive credit 
expansion and leverage, lax lending standards, and ineffective 
official oversight of key markets and participant institutions. These 
factors have been vetted in official analyses and widely discussed 
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The main features of the crisis can be briefly summarized as 
follows. First, markets for liquidity and their supporting derivatives 
markets became dysfunctional, reflecting an underlying breakdown 
of trust in systemically important counterparty relationships 
among the large global active financial institutions. Credit 
markets and their surrounding derivatives markets were similarly 
dysfunctional, which created further pressures in markets for 
liquidity and thus further increased the intensity of underlying 
creditworthiness issues. Second, the market displayed a growing 
perception of the increasing risk of a prolonged and possibly deep 
U.S. and global economic recession. Third, key central banks in 
the major international financial centers lost control of monetary 
and financial conditions, which reduced their ability to exercise 
their policy instruments to safeguard both monetary and financial 
stability. Fourth, a number of innovative policy changes were 
implemented, including the use of existing facilities in new ways 
(extended terms and access) and the extension of facilities to 
nonbank financial intermediaries. At the international level, central 
banks in advanced countries coordinated their actions. Finally, the 
United States and Europe extended official financial support to both 
bank and nonbank financial institutions, and the U.S. Treasury 
spearheaded a legislative initiative to remove toxic assets and 
recapitalize weak systemically important institutions.
The bottom line is that the existing policy framework, which 
relies on a balance of market discipline and official oversight, failed 
to prevent the imbalances from arising. Moreover, the existing 
mechanisms for resolving problems from becoming systemic proved 
to be inadequate. In effect, all lines of defense failed to prevent a 
relatively small financial problem from becoming systemic, in part 
because other lines of defense failed earlier on to prevent the buildup 
of overwhelming and unsustainable imbalances in credit markets, 
including massive, opaque, highly-leveraged, and essentially 
unregulated financial structures and securities.
Policymakers  are  continuing  to  innovate  to  create  new 
mechanisms to contain systemic risk and restore confidence and 
both economic and financial stability. Ultimately, they will need 
to create a new policy framework and a more sustainable financial 
system architecture (which has already begun in the United States) 
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2. finanCial sTabiliTy as The objeCTive 
An important prerequisite for success in safeguarding financial 
stability in the future is the development of an intellectual 
framework that perceives the safeguarding of financial stability as 
a policy objective on a par with monetary stability, which has been 
perceived for several decades as a key prerequisite for sustaining 
durable economic growth and economic stability more generally.2 An 
important component of this intellectual framework will no doubt 
be the enhanced ability to assess whether the financial system is 
capable of continuing to perform its main financial and economic 
functions in the presence of sizable unexpected shocks. Designing 
a framework for making assessments of this kind must, to some 
extent, be grounded in a practical conception of what is meant by 
financial stability and the ability to sustain it. To be useful for 
assessing the potential for systemic risk and events, the definition 
and framework must link the performance of the financial system to 
its ability to facilitate continued economic growth and stability. In 
short, the framework for assessing financial stability must assess 
the potential impact of financial vulnerabilities on the real economy. 
The existing frameworks did this prior to the current crises, but 
they clearly failed to provide early warnings of the impending 
financial dysfunctioning and its potential impact on the United 
States and global economies. The time is ripe for brainstorming 
and fresh thinking.
One reason why policymakers and academics have relied on 
concepts of financial instability rather than financial stability is 
that it is difficult to define what is meant by financial stability. 
First, stability is a difficult concept to define for an evolving, 
innovating, organic entity such as a financial system, which is 
constantly transforming itself. Second, it is difficult to define what 
is meant by equilibrium in finance, in part because equilibrium 
prices and resource allocations today depend on expectations of 
future outcomes, while expectations can be highly volatile if not 
unstable. Third, the essence of a financial transaction is an IOU or a 
promissory note involving human trust—the very kind of trust that 
2. This section is based on material in Schinasi (2006), Fell and Schinasi (2005), 
and Houben, Kakes, and Schinasi (2004). I am grateful to my coauthors and to the 
U.K. National Institute Economic Review for granting permission to use all or part of 
this material.40 Garry J. Schinasi
policymakers were trying to restore in October 2008. This section 
tries to motivate and examine a definition of financial stability that 
has the potential for helping us safeguard financial stability.
2.1 Conceptual Challenges
Public policy typically tries to mitigate the impact of efficiency 
losses associated with market imperfections. In finance, however, each 
and every loss of efficiency does not necessarily require intervention. 
The desirability or necessity of some form of collective intervention 
is much clearer when a market imperfection in finance leads to an 
inefficiency that poses a significant threat to financial stability, because 
of the impact on either financial institutions or markets or both. 
Unfortunately, the financial system policy literature rarely 
makes a clear distinction between sources of market imperfections 
that threaten stability and those that do not. This is because it is 
difficult to measure the efficiency losses associated with market 
imperfections in finance and to assess the risks to financial stability 
associated with market imperfections. These are some of the 
challenges in the period ahead, for which an analytical framework 
for financial stability would be useful for policy purposes. 
2.2 Financial Stability Challenge
There are many ways to characterize the challenges to achieving 
and maintaining financial stability. Moreover, the nature of the 
challenge will depend on the structure and maturity of the economic 
system. For mature financial systems, the financial stability challenge 
can be characterized as maintaining the smooth functioning of the 
financial system and its ability to facilitate and support the efficient 
functioning and performance of the economy. To achieve financial 
stability, it is necessary to have in place mechanisms designed to 
prevent financial problems from becoming systemic or threatening 
the stability of the financial and economic systems, while maintaining 
(or not undermining) the economy’s ability to sustain growth and 
perform its other important functions.
The challenge is not necessarily to prevent all financial 
problems from arising. First, it is not practical to expect that a 
dynamic and effective financial system would avoid instances of 
market volatility and turbulence, or that all financial institutions 
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involved in providing financial services and enhancing financial 
stakeholder value. Second, it would be undesirable to create and 
impose mechanisms that are overly protective of market stability or 
that too tightly constrain the risk taking of financial institutions. 
Constraints could be so intrusive and inhibiting that they could 
reduce the extent of risk taking to the point where economic 
efficiency is inhibited. Moreover, the mechanisms of protection or 
insurance could, if poorly designed and implemented, create the 
moral hazard of even greater risk taking.
Maintaining the economy’s ability to sustain growth and perform 
its other important functions is an important aspect of the challenge 
of financial stability. The achievement and maintenance of financial 
stability should be balanced against other, perhaps higher-priority 
objectives such as economic efficiency. This reflects the notion that 
finance is not an end in itself, but plays a supporting role in improving 
the economic system’s ability to perform its functions.
That the challenge is a balancing act can be seen by considering 
that the likelihood of systemic problems could be limited in practice by 
designing a set of rules and regulations that restrict financial activities 
in such a way that the incidence or likelihood of destabilizing asset 
price volatility, asset market turbulence, or individual bank failures 
could be eliminated. This type of stability, however, would be achieved 
at the great expense of economic and financial efficiency. 
2.3 Stability and Efficiency Are Not Separable 
This reasoning leads to the impression, if not conclusion, that 
there is an ex ante trade-off between achieving economic and financial 
efficiency, on the one hand, and economic and financial stability, on 
the other. That is, if one is concerned solely with stability, then it 
may be possible (though not necessarily desirable) to achieve and 
maintain it by trading off some efficiency. 
The possibility of an ex ante trade-off can be illustrated by 
narrowing the definitions of stability and efficiency. Consider a 
market for a good whose price is sensitive to incoming information, a 
characteristic of many asset markets. In principle, one could limit the 
variability of the asset price by imposing restrictions in the market 
that would inhibit the ability of traders to price in every small piece 
of information. But from a trader’s and investor’s perspective, such 
restrictions could inhibit the efficiency of the market’s ability to price 
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On the other hand, it is possible to try to maintain efficiency, 
and even enhance it, while still allowing the financial system room 
to innovate, evolve, and better support the economic system. If 
the cost of doing so is greater asset price volatility or capital flow 
volatility, it is up to society to choose a point along this continuum 
of trade-offs (figure 1). 
Figure 1. Efficiency and Stability Frontiers
A. Mature financial system
B. Emerging market financial system
Source: Author’s drawing.
Some have characterized the difference between the American 
financial system and the European financial system as choices of 
different points along this continuum of trade-offs. The American 
system is more market oriented in that the financing of both household 
and corporate activities is accomplished more through markets than 43 Defining Financial Stability and Establishing a Framework
in Europe, where there is much greater reliance on bank funding 
and less reliance on tradable securities (although this is changing). 
While one might argue that the American system of finance has led 
to greater economic productivity and efficiency, this greater efficiency 
is accompanied by greater asset market volatility and turbulence 
and a greater observed propensity to financial stress.
From a broader perspective, the challenge of achieving and 
maintaining financial stability goes well beyond the stability of asset 
prices, or of prices generally. This is not to say that authorities, and 
central banks in particular, should not be concerned with asset price 
volatility, and price volatility more generally, because they determine 
the value of money. Instead, the challenge of financial stability is 
broader than, and in fact encompasses, the need to limit the impact 
of price instability on the functioning of the overall financial system. 
If the financial system is stable, it will be able to tolerate higher 
levels of asset price volatility as well as other financial problems, 
including weaknesses in financial institutions. 
At the highest level of generality, the challenge of safeguarding 
financial stability is to have in place a framework for managing 
the risk of a systemwide problem. There is as yet no international 
agreement on what such a framework might be, and policymakers 
always seem to be trying to prevent the last crisis. In other words, 
there is much work yet to be done to establish an agreed and flexible 
framework for safeguarding financial stability against the kind of 
imbalances that surfaced last summer and that led to the ongoing 
global systemic crisis. 
3. RequiReD ConCepTual elemenTs of a fRamewoRk
A financial system performs several key functions that foster 
and support the effectiveness of the real economy: matching savers 
with investors; pricing and allocating financial resources and 
risks; and sustainably facilitating various intertemporal economic 
processes such as wealth accumulation, economic growth, and social 
prosperity. 
It is difficult to reasonably and practically justify an operationally 
useful definition of financial stability and a framework for 
safeguarding it that does not acknowledge and incorporate these 
key functions as core elements. Nevertheless, the economics and 
finance professions—both policy oriented and academic—have yet 
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for formulating financial system policies. This subsection addresses 
these and related issues by discussing the important conceptual 
elements that could usefully help the professions safeguard financial 
stability. The discussion necessarily entails defining terms and 
examining their implications.
3.1 Toward a Framework
A framework for financial stability can best be understood as a 
set of definitions, concepts, and organizing principles that impose 
discipline on the analysis of the financial system. An important 
component of a framework for safeguarding financial stability is the 
early identification of risks and vulnerabilities that might threaten 
the maintenance of stability. 
An effective framework would seem to require three important 
standards. First, there must be rigorous definitions and understanding 
of key concepts, such as what is meant by the terms financial system, 
financial stability and instability, and systemic risk, just to name 
a few. Second, to be most useful for monitoring and policy, the 
framework’s concepts and definitions ultimately must be either 
directly measurable or correlated with measures: in other words 
the concepts and definitions must have useful and policy-relevant 
empirical counterparts. Third, the set of definitions, concepts, and 
organizing principles, along with their empirical counterparts, 
must serve the purpose of ensuring internal consistency in the 
identification of sources of risks and vulnerabilities and in the design 
and implementation of policies aimed at resolving difficulties should 
they emerge.
It is important to define the relevant concepts appropriately, 
especially financial stability, the financial system, and systemic risk. 
3.2 Defining Financial System 
Broadly, the financial system can be seen as comprising three 
separable but closely related components. First, there are financial 
intermediaries that pool funds and risks and then allocate them to 
their competing uses. Financial institutions increasingly provide a 
range of services beyond the traditional banking services of taking 
deposits and making loans, while institutions such as insurance 
companies, pension funds, hedge funds, and financial-nonfinancial 
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services. Second, there are financial markets that directly match 
savers and investors, for example, through the issuance and sale of 
bonds or equities directly to investors. Third, there is the financial 
infrastructure, which includes both privately and publicly owned and 
operated institutions (such as clearance, payment, and settlements 
systems for financial transactions) and monetary, legal, accounting, 
regulatory, supervisory, and surveillance infrastructures.3 
Both private and public persons participate in financial markets 
and in vital components of the financial infrastructure. Governments 
borrow in markets, hedge risks, operate through markets to conduct 
monetary policy and to maintain monetary stability, and own and 
operate payment and settlement systems. Accordingly, the term 
financial system encompasses both the monetary system, with its 
official understandings, agreements, conventions, and institutions, 
and the processes, institutions, and conventions of private financial 
activities.4 Any analysis of how the financial system works and how 
well it is performing its key functions requires an understanding of 
these components.
From this definition, one could reasonably expect that financial 
stability and monetary stability are related in some meaningful ways. 
These relationships will become more transparent in what follows.
3.3 Defining Financial Stability 
As yet, no consensus has been reached on a useful working 
definition of financial stability. Some authors define financial 
instability instead of stability.5 Others prefer to define the problem 
in terms of managing systemic risk rather than as maintaining or 
safeguarding financial stability.6 Consistent with some aspects of 
these alternative definitions, I propose and analyze a definition of 
3. On the role of the legal system, see, for example, Levine (1999), Leahy and 
others (2001).
4. This particular formulation is an adaptation of the international financial 
system in Truman (2003).
5. See, for example, the definitions of Central Bank of Norway (2003), Chant 
(2003), Crockett (1996), Deutsche Bundesbank (2003), Duisenberg (2001), Ferguson 
(2002), Foot (2003), Large (2003), Mishkin (1999), Padoa-Schioppa (2003), Schwartz 
(1986), and Wellink (2002), which are surveyed in Schinasi (2004a, 2006). Davis (2002) 
develops a typology of instability.
6. From a policy perspective, a positive approach focusing on financial stability 
is more useful than a negative one focusing on financial instability (see Schinasi, 
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financial stability that has three important characteristics (Schinasi, 
2004a, 2004b, 2006). First, the financial system is efficiently and 
smoothly facilitating the intertemporal allocation of resources from 
savers to investors and the allocation of economic resources generally. 
Second, forward-looking financial risks are being assessed and priced 
reasonably accurately and are also being relatively well managed. 
Third, the financial system is in such condition that it can comfortably, 
if not smoothly, absorb financial and real economic surprises and 
shocks. If any one or a combination of these characteristics is not 
being maintained, then it is likely that the financial system is moving 
in the direction of becoming less stable, and at some point it might 
exhibit instability. For example, inefficiencies in the allocation of 
capital or shortcomings in the pricing of risk can compromise future 
financial system stability by laying the foundation for imbalances 
and vulnerabilities.
All three aspects of this definition entail both endogenous and 
exogenous elements. For example, surprises that can impinge on 
financial stability can emanate both from within and from outside 
the financial system. Moreover, the intertemporal and forward-
looking aspects of this particular way of defining financial stability 
serve to emphasize that threats to financial stability arise not only 
from shocks or surprises, but also from the possibility of disorderly 
adjustments of imbalances that have built endogenously over a period 
of time—because, for example, expectations of future returns were 
misperceived and therefore mispriced.7 
Defining financial stability in this way has several important 
implications. First, judgments about the performance of the 
financial system entail how well the financial system is facilitating 
economic resource allocation, the savings and investment process, 
and ultimately economic growth. There are two-way linkages: the 
real economy can be positively or negatively affected by the financial 
system, and the performance of the financial system can be affected 
by the performance of the real economy. For a framework to be 
useful for assessing financial stability, it must pay attention to these 
linkages. Disturbances in financial markets or at individual financial 
institutions need not be considered threats to financial stability if 
they are not expected to damage economic activity at large. In fact, 
7. That financial stability should not be thought of simply as a static concept of 
shock absorption capacity is emphasized by Minsky (1982) and Kindleberger (1996), 
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the incidental closing of a (minor) financial institution, a rise in 
asset price volatility, and sharp and even turbulent corrections in 
financial markets may be the result of competitive forces, the efficient 
incorporation of new information, and the economic system’s self-
correcting and self-disciplining mechanisms. By implication, in the 
absence of contagion and a high likelihood of systemic effects, such 
developments may be viewed as welcome from a financial stability 
perspective. Just as in Schumpeterian business cycles, where the 
adoption of new technologies and recessions have both constructive 
and destructive implications, a certain amount of instability can 
be tolerated from time to time because it may encourage long-term 
efficiency in the financial system.8
Second, financial stability is a broad concept, encompassing the 
different aspects of the financial system, including infrastructure, 
institutions, and markets. Because of the interlinkages between these 
components, expectations of disturbances in any one component can 
affect overall stability, requiring a systemic perspective. Consistent 
with the definition of the financial system, at any given time, stability 
or instability could be the result of either private institutions and 
actions or official institutions and actions, or both simultaneously 
or iteratively.
Third, financial stability implies not only that the financial system 
adequately fulfills its role in allocating resources, transforming 
and managing risks, mobilizing savings, and facilitating wealth 
accumulation and growth, but also that within this system, the flow 
of payments throughout the economy functions smoothly (across 
official and private, retail and wholesale, and formal and informal 
payment mechanisms). This requires that money—both central bank 
money and its close-substitute, derivative monies (such as demand 
deposits and other bank accounts)—adequately fulfills its role as a 
means of payment and unit of account and, when appropriate, as a 
(short-term) store of value. In other words, financial stability and 
what is usually regarded as a vital part of monetary stability overlap 
to a large extent.9
Fourth, financial stability requires the absence of financial crises 
and the ability of the financial system to limit and deal with the 
emergence of imbalances before they constitute a threat to stability. 
8. See Schumpeter (1934).
9. See Padoa-Schioppa (2003) and Schinasi (2003) on the role of central banks in 
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In a well-functioning and stable financial system, this occurs in part 
through self-corrective, market-disciplining mechanisms that create 
resilience and that endogenously prevent problems from festering 
and growing into systemwide risks. In this respect, there may be 
a policy choice between allowing market mechanisms to work to 
resolve potential difficulties and intervening quickly and effectively 
(through liquidity injections via markets, for example) to restore risk 
taking or stability. Thus, financial stability entails both preventive 
and remedial dimensions. 
Finally, financial stability can be thought of as occurring 
along a continuum, reflecting different possible combinations of 
conditions of the financial system’s constituent parts. An analogy 
is the health of an organism, which also occurs along a continuum. 
A healthy organism can usually reach for a greater level of health 
and well-being, and the range of what is normal is broad and multi-
dimensional. In addition, not all states of unhealth (or illness) are 
significant, systemic, or life threatening, and some illnesses, even 
temporarily serious ones, allow the organism to continue to function 
reasonably productively and return to a state of health without 
permanent damage. One implication of seeing financial stability in 
this way is that maintaining financial stability does not necessarily 
require that each part of the financial system operates persistently 
at peak performance; it is consistent with the financial system 
operating on a spare tire from time to time.10 
The concept of a continuum is relevant because finance 
fundamentally involves uncertainty, is dynamic (meaning it is both 
intertemporal and innovative), and is composed of many interlinked 
and evolutionary elements (such as infrastructure, institutions, and 
markets). Accordingly, financial stability is expectations based, 
dynamic, and dependent on many parts of the system working 
reasonably well. What might represent stability at one point in time 
might be more or less stable at some other time, depending on other 
aspects of the economic system such as technological, political, and 
social developments. Moreover, financial stability can be seen as 
being consistent with various combinations of the conditions of its 
constituent parts, such as the soundness of financial institutions, 
financial markets conditions, and effectiveness of the various 
components of the financial infrastructure. 
10. See Greenspan (1999).49 Defining Financial Stability and Establishing a Framework
3.4 Defining Systemic Financial Risk
According to a report on financial consolidation and risk by the 
Group of Ten (G-10), “Systemic financial risk is the risk that an event 
will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant 
increases in uncertainly about, a substantial portion of the financial 
system that is serious enough to quite probably have significant adverse 
effects on the real economy. Systemic risk events can be sudden and 
unexpected, or the likelihood of their occurrence can build up through 
time in the absence of appropriate policy responses. The adverse real 
economic effects from systemic problems are generally seen as arising 
from disruptions to the payment system, to credit flows, and from the 
destruction of asset values” (Group of Ten, 2001, p. 126). The G-10 study 
notes that this definition encompasses much of what is in the literature, 
but it is stricter in two respects. First, the negative externalities of a 
systemic event extend into the real economy, rather than being confined 
to the financial system. Second, this extension into the real economy 
occurs with relatively high probability. The emphasis on real effects 
reflects the view that it is the output of real goods and services and the 
accompanying employment implications that are the primary concern 
of economic policymakers. “In this definition, a financial disruption that 
does not have a high probability of causing a significant disruption of 
real economic activity is not a systemic risk event” (p. 126).
Taken together, a good understanding of what is meant by financial 
stability and financial instability can serve to define boundaries 
around the scope of the analysis. The safeguarding of financial stability 
should not be understood as a zero tolerance of bank failures or as an 
avoidance of market volatility, but it should seek to prevent financial 
disruptions that lead to real economic costs.11
4. a fRamewoRk foR assessing finanCial sTabiliTy
With working definitions of the financial system, financial stability, 
and systemic risk in hand, it is now possible to discuss the key role 
of financial stability assessments in safeguarding financial stability. 
A key to safeguarding financial stability is the early identification 
of risks to stability and potential sources of vulnerability in the 
financial system before they lead to unsustainable and potentially 
11. Papers that focus on aspects of systemic risk include de Bandt and Hartmann 
(2000), Hoelscher and Quintyn (2003), and Summer (2003).50 Garry J. Schinasi
damaging imbalances and consequences. For example, weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities could exist in any of the components of the financial 
system—namely, institutions, markets, and infrastructure—and 
could entail all three simultaneously. Along with identifying potential 
sources of risks and vulnerabilities, it is also desirable to attempt to 
calibrate their intensity and potential for (or probability of) leading 
to financial system problems and possible systemic effects. Financial 
stability assessments are a key part of prevention.
Figure 2 presents a schematic of a reasonable framework for 
assessing financial stability. Both prevention and resolution of 
financial imbalances are part of the framework.
Figure 2. Framework for Maintaining Financial System 
Stability
Sources: Schinasi (2006); Houben, Kakes, and Schinasi (2004).51 Defining Financial Stability and Establishing a Framework
To prevent financial imbalances from occurring or becoming 
significant enough to pose a risk to financial stability, the approach 
taken should entail a continuous process of information gathering, 
technical analysis, monitoring, and assessment. Because of the 
linkages between the real economy and the financial system, and 
also between the various components of the financial system, this 
continuous process would be most useful if it encompassed both 
economic and financial dimensions, together with institutional 
knowledge  about  institutions,  markets,  and  the  financial 
infrastructure. In effect, the process needs to be comprehensive 
and analytical (see the top bar in figure 2). Finally, ongoing and 
fundamental research into the changing structure of the financial 
system and its changing linkages to the real economy, as well as 
the further development of measurement techniques for detecting 
growing imbalances and calibrating risks and vulnerabilities, are 
vital for keeping this important monitoring phase up to date.
The process entails gathering information about, and monitoring, 
the macroeconomy (and at times microeconomic aspects, as well) 
and the various aspects of the financial system through supervisory, 
regulatory, and surveillance mechanisms. Each of the financial system 
monitoring components could entail both macro- and microprudential 
characteristics. For example, when it comes to gathering information 
about and monitoring individual institutions, the supervisory process 
could be aided by knowledge about where the economy is along the 
business and credit cycles and how markets have been performing 
overall, because the macroeconomy and markets provide the 
background against which the operational performance of individual 
institutions should be assessed. Likewise, an assessment of the 
condition of financial markets must take into account whether the 
major institutions operating in the markets were well capitalized and 
profitable. This is another way of observing that there are tradeoffs in 
safeguarding financial stability, even in the assessment process. 
The reason for gathering information, analyzing it, and 
continuously monitoring the various components of, and influences on, 
the financial system is to make systematic and periodic assessments 
of whether the financial system is performing its main functions well 
enough to be positioned within a corridor of financial stability along the 
continuum discussed earlier. Such an assessment could lead to three 
conclusions, which have quite different implications for action (see the 
middle bar in figure 2, labeled assessment). The assessment might 
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financial stability, approaching a boundary of stability and instability, 
or outside a zone or corridor of stability. Within the third category, the 
financial system could further be in a position in which self-corrective 
processes and mechanisms are likely to move the system back toward 
the corridor of stability or, alternatively, to need prompt remedial or 
even emergency measures to reverse the instability.12
One could also develop a delineation of financial conditions and 
potential difficulties according to their intensity, scope, and potential 
threat to systemic stability. For example, potential financial difficulties 
can be thought of as falling into one of the following fairly broad 
categories: difficulties in a single institution or market that are not 
likely to have systemwide consequences for either the banking or 
financial system; difficulties that involve several relatively important 
institutions involved in market activities, with some nontrivial 
probability of spillovers and contagion to other institutions and 
markets; and problems that are likely to spread to a significant number 
and types of financial institutions and across usually unrelated 
markets for managing liquidity needs, such as forward, interbank, 
and even equity markets. Problems occurring within these categories 
would require different diagnostic tools and policy responses, ranging 
from doing nothing to intensifying supervision or surveillance of a 
specific institution or market, to liquidity injections into the markets 
to dissipate strains, to interventions into particular institutions.
4.1 Practical Challenges in Implementing an 
Assessment Framework
While categories of possible assessments may be easy to discuss in 
principle, they are difficult to identify in actual practice. How should 
the boundary of stability be defined and measured, for example? 
When does an isolated small problem threaten to become a systemic 
one? There would also seem to be a bias toward being prudent, 
leading authorities to overreach in identifying both potential sources 
of risks and vulnerability and to overestimate their likelihood and 
importance. Thus, it would be useful to establish some ground rules 
or guidelines for disciplining the continuous process of information 
gathering, analysis, and monitoring, and identifying sources of 
12. As Kindleberger (1996) puts it, “markets work well, on the whole, and can normally 
be relied upon to decide the allocation of resources and, within limits, the distribution of 
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risk and vulnerability. A check list of disciplining principles for 
identifying risks and vulnerabilities and for assessing where along 
the stability spectrum the financial system might be could include 
the following:13 
—Is the process systematic?
—Are the risks identified plausible?
—Are the identified risks systemically relevant?
—Can linkages and transmission (or contagion) channels be 
identified?
—Have risks and linkages been cross-checked?
—Has the identification of risks and the assessment been 
consistent over time?
In practice, the process of assessing financial stability entails 
a systematic identification and analysis of the sources of risk and 
vulnerability that could impinge on stability in the circumstances 
in which the assessment is being made. For example, consider the 
comprehensive list of sources of risks in table 3. An operationally 
significant distinction is made between endogenous sources of risk 
that are present within the financial system and exogenous sources 
of risk that might emanate from outside the realm of finance. 
In keeping with the broad definition of the financial system 
outlined above, endogenous sources of risk can arise in financial 
institutions, financial markets, infrastructures, or any combination 
thereof. For instance, credit, market, or liquidity risks may be present 
in financial institutions, and, if they materialize, they could hamper 
the process of reallocating financial resources between savers and 
investors. Financial markets can be a source of endogenous risk not 
only because they offer alternative sources of finance to nonfinancial 
sectors, but also because they entail systemic linkages between 
financial institutions and, more directly, between savers and investors. 
Financial infrastructures are also an important endogenous source of 
risk, in part because they entail linkages between market participants, 
but also because they provide the institutional framework in which 
financial institutions and markets operate. 
Outside the financial system, the macroeconomic environment 
can be an exogenous source of risk for financial stability because 
it directly influences the ability of economic and financial actors 
(namely, households, companies, and even the government) to 
honor their financial obligations. Financial stability assessments 
13. These ideas and concepts are developed in detail in Fell and Schinasi (2005). 54 Garry J. Schinasi
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should entail a systematic and periodic process for monitoring 
each of these sources of risks, both individually and collectively 
by taking account of cross-sector and cross-border linkages. This 
process should satisfy the list above.
There are also formidable challenges in assessing the strength and 
robustness of the measures and models calibrating the plausibility 
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the potential costs should risks materialize. In actual practice, many 
shortcuts and qualitative judgments must be made to produce an 
overall assessment. 
For most macroeconomic or monetary policy objectives (such 
as unemployment, external or budgetary equilibrium, and price 
inflation), there is a widely accepted measurable indicator (or set of 
indicators) that defines the objective and measure deviations from 
it, even if still subject to methodological and analytical debate and 
even controversy. In the case of both macroeconomics and monetary 
economics, it took twenty to thirty years of practice, trial and error, 
measurement and modeling development, and fundamental research 
to accomplish this. As noted in the introduction, financial stability 
analysis is still in an infant stage of development. Consequently, 
there is as yet no widely accepted set of measurable indicators of 
financial stability that can be monitored and assessed over time. In 
part, this reflects the multifaceted nature of financial stability, as 
it relates both to the stability and resilience of financial institutions 
and to the smooth functioning of financial markets and settlement 
systems over time.14 Moreover, these diverse factors need to be 
weighed in terms of their potential ultimate influence on real 
economic activity. The lack of indicators also reflects the relatively 
young age of the discipline of financial stability asessment. Because 
measurement is not yet highly developed, the current practice of 
assessing financial stability is more an art form than a rigorous 
discipline or science. 
The challenges in measuring financial system stability reach well 
beyond the challenges of measuring the degree of stability in each 
individual subcomponent of the financial system. Financial stability 
requires that the constituent components of the system—financial 
institutions, markets, and infrastructures—are jointly stable. 
Weaknesses and vulnerabilities in one component may or may not 
compromise the stability of the system as a whole, depending on size 
and linkages, including the degree and effectiveness of risk sharing 
between different components. Aggregating information across 
the system also presents challenges, since different parts of the 
system perform different tasks. For example, in diversified financial 
14. Sets of indicators have been developed, and are widely used, for assessing 
the soundness of banking institutions. See, for example, core and encouraged sets of 
soundness indicators in IMF and World Bank (2003) and the IMF’s guide on financial 
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systems, where both financial institutions and markets are important 
providers of finance, there is no commonly accepted way of aggregating 
information on the degree of stability in both the banking system and 
financial markets to form an overall assessment of system stability. If 
the banking system is functioning well but, at the same time, there are 
signs of strain in financial markets, the overall assessment of financial 
system stability is likely to be ambiguous ex ante, particularly if the 
two components account for similar shares of finance provision. The 
more complex and sophisticated a financial system, the more complex 
will be the task of precisely measuring overall stability. 
Financial stability assessments carry a higher degree of 
uncertainty than is ordinarily associated with forecasts based on 
macroeconometric models. This is because there are formidable 
practical challenges to measuring, modeling, and assessing the 
consequences of rare events. First, if past crises were prevented or 
tackled by policy actions, then the assessment of the likely costs of 
a selected scenario, based on simulations drawn from historical data 
sets, will likely be biased unless sufficient account is taken of policy 
reaction functions. It is doubtful that past policy responses to episodes 
of financial stress could be summarized by a mechanical reaction 
function, particularly if the authorities were mindful of avoiding 
the moral hazards that typically follow from predictable behavior. 
Moreover, even in cases that did not lead to policy responses, the 
frequency of crises in historical data sets may be too low to facilitate 
precision in estimating the likely policy-neutral consequences of a 
stylized scenario. 
Second, confidence intervals around the expected output losses 
associated with the materialization of a specified scenario may not 
be well defined statistically—or even defined at all. For instance, 
simulations based on historical episodes tend to be founded on 
statistical relationships that reflect the central tendency of probability 
distributions, rather than the tails. Moreover, for hypothetical 
scenarios, which have not occurred in the past, it may not be possible 
to compute a confidence interval around the simulation because 
the events themselves may be subject to Knightian uncertainty or 
unquantifiable risk.15
Third, most macroeconometric models used for stress testing tend 
to be built on the basis of log-linear relationships. For simulations, 
this means that a doubling of the size of a shock will result in a 
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proportionate change in the effect. In reality, however, unpredictable 
nonlinearities may surface in situations of financial stress, for 
instance as a result of threshold effects. 
Fourth, as witnessed during the near collapse of Long Term 
Capital Management in 1998, crises may expose unexpected linkages, 
such as correlations between financial markets that ordinarily tend 
to be uncorrelated. Given such uncertainties, the real economic costs 
associated with a particular scenario could well prove to be larger 
than those predicted by an empirical model. Such considerations 
would suggest that the output of any stress tests should only 
be viewed as indicative of how, or if, the financial system would 
endure adverse disturbances. To avoid complacency, analysts must 
exercise a high degree of caution and judgment in forming financial 
assessments. 
If the practice of financial stability assessment is to advance from 
what is essentially an art to a science, progress is necessary on at 
least three fronts: data, models, and the understanding of linkages. 
A priority for data gathering must be microeconomic balance sheet 
data covering financial institutions, households, and firms. While a 
picture of the aggregate risks borne within each of these sectors can 
be useful for financial stability analysis, far more important is an 
understanding of the way in which the risks are distributed across 
sectors and whether concentrations or pockets of vulnerabilities 
can be pinpointed. In mature economies, the availability and 
comprehensiveness of such data are rather mixed, particularly for 
the household sector. 
Two areas where more and better analytical research on financial 
stability modeling appears necessary include models for identifying 
risks and vulnerabilities and models for assessing the consequences 
of adverse disturbances.16 Concerning the identification of risks, 
the literature suggests that models are unlikely to ever be capable 
of predicting crises, particularly in terms of the precise timing. 
Nevertheless, this should not stand in the way of developing 
models for assessing vulnerabilities. Even simple, single-indicator 
approaches can be useful for gauging risks to financial stability (see 
Campbell and Shiller, 2001), and current work holds promise for the 
development of more comprehensive frameworks for pinpointing the 
16. See Sahajwala and van den Berg (2000) for an overview of early warning 
systems used by some G-10 authorities; see Persson and Blåvarg (2003) on the use of 
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sets of variables (see IMF, 2004) and the conditions that raise the 
likelihood of financial stress (for example, see Aspachs and others, 
2006). As for the prediction of crises, the intellectual advances made 
in other disciplines in the modeling of complex and discontinuous 
processes—such as the prediction of earthquakes—may offer insights 
for financial stability assessment. 
5. ConCluDing obseRvaTions
The ongoing crisis reveals that the framework in place prior to 
the summer 2007 was inadequate for safeguarding the stability of 
the global financial system against a systemic threat emanating from 
both the real and financial economies around the globe. All lines of 
defense against imbalances growing to systemic proportions were 
breached, and they collectively failed to work as intended or hoped. 
This applies to both private and official lines of defense against 
systemic threats to stability, as outlined earlier in the paper.
Once stability is restored and short-term emergency measures are 
reversed, an important fundamental remaining challenge is for the 
international community to agree on a framework for safeguarding 
financial stability once it is achieved. This requires a deeper 
understanding of what financial stability requires and how economic 
stability depends on the presumption of financial stability. This is 
not yet fully understood in the academic and policy communities.
It would help to have a consensus of what is meant by financial 
stability and an agreed framework for safeguarding it. As discussed 
in this paper, such a framework must entail both the prevention 
of imbalances from becoming systemic and resolution mechanisms 
for limiting the damage of systemic problems if they surface. Both 
aspects of the existing frameworks around the world have proven 
to be inadequate for containing systemic risk in the modern global 
financial system.
Success in safeguarding stability will require the development 
of analytical frameworks for understanding the difficult conceptual 
and policy challenges in preventing the buildup of systemic risk 
and dealing with it should prevention fail. Likewise, analytical 
frameworks are needed for practically monitoring and assessing 
both financial stability and the financial system’s ability to eliminate 
imbalances as they arise through market-based mechanisms—or 
ex ante market discipline. If the ability to dissipate imbalances is 
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to experience a state of instability for which remedial actions would 
be required.
One objective of this paper was to propose some steps for 
developing a conceptual framework for safeguarding financial 
stability based on a definition of financial stability. The definition 
proposed explicitly links the concept of financial stability to that 
of economic efficiency and stability. In practice, such a definition 
can be thought of as providing a basis for an analytical framework 
that explicitly links the performance of the financial system to the 
performance of the economic system. One of the main weaknesses 
of current practices is that we do not yet sufficiently understand 
the linkages between the real and financial economies. This gap in 
knowledge reflects the economics profession’s inability to integrate 
the analysis of macroeconomic and financial system tendencies. 
Without significant progress in this dimension, it is unlikely that 
much long-lasting success will be achieved in safeguarding global 
financial stability. My hope is that some of the ideas put forward 
in this paper will help others find practical solutions to some of the 
important remaining challenges.60 Garry J. Schinasi
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